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Gritzalis 
Abstract—Despite of the several benefits of migrating enterprise critical assets to the Cloud, there are challenges specifically 
related to security and privacy. It is important that Cloud Users understand their security and privacy needs, based on their 
specific context and select cloud model best fit to support these needs. The literature provides works that focus on discussing 
security and privacy issues for cloud systems but such works do not provide a detailed methodological approach to elicit 
security and privacy requirements neither methods to select cloud deployment models based on satisfaction of these 
requirements by Cloud Service Providers. This work advances the current state of the art towards this direction. In particular, we 
consider requirements engineering concepts to elicit and analyze security and privacy requirements and their associated 
mechanisms using a conceptual framework and a systematic process. The work introduces assurance as evidence for 
satisfying the security and privacy requirements in terms of completeness and reportable of security incident through audit. This 
allows perspective cloud users to define their assurance requirements so that appropriate cloud models can be selected for a 
given context. To demonstrate our work, we present results from a real case study based on the Greek National Gazette.  
Index Terms— Cloud Deployment, Security, Privacy, Assurance, Migration 
1 INTRODUCTION
igrating into the cloud certainly gives an organiza-
tion tangible competitive advantages due to signifi-
cant cost savings, improved degree of scalability, flexibil-
ity and resource pooling availability. Moreover, organiza-
tions can take advantage of Infrastructure, Platform or 
Software as a Service deployment models and a range of 
service models to choose from – Public, Private, Hybrid 
and Community. However, there are many uncertainties 
about the migration process, specifically related to the 
dependency of an outside provider for the existing busi-
ness model, data usage and leakage, lack of understand-
ing about the cloud, and many more [1,2,27,28]. 
Security and privacy are major concerns for organiza-
tions, which hinder cloud adaption as migrating into the 
cloud means organizations need to store their sensitive 
electronic assets into the providers’ infrastructure [18]. 
Existing business applications and data are mostly con-
trolled through the provider’s infrastructure depending 
on the chosen model, i.e. Saas, PaaS, IaaS, on which users 
may not have full/any control. Users’ data are generally 
stored in a multi-tenant platform. This scenario intro-
duces extra security and privacy challenges comparing to 
the traditional computing environment. Lack of monitor-
ing facility of user data incurs less user confidence on 
cloud based systems. Techniques to analyze the security 
and privacy issues in the context of cloud computing are 
different to those provided by the existing literature for 
traditional computing environments [17,18, 19].  It is 
therefore necessary to develop methods that not only 
identify and analyse security and privacy requirements 
but also provide certain assurance that these require-
ments are met by a specific cloud model before undertak-
ing the migration decision. While such initiative have 
been put in place in for tradional IT based systems [8],  
the literature fails to provide evidence of a framework 
that fulfills that objective for cloud based services. This 
paper provides work towards this direction.  
The novelty of the presented work is twofold. Firstly, it 
contributes to the current state of the art by providing a 
modeling framework that supports the elicitation and 
analysis of security and privacy needs, and a cloud mi-
gration process for the selection of an appropriate cloud 
model. Secondly, it introduces assurance requirements in 
the proposed framework and in the designed process and 
it examines their critical role during the migration process 
for the selection of the most appropriate Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP). Specifically, we use requirements engi-
neering concepts such as goal, actor, security and privacy 
constrains, mechanisms and we introduce assurance re-
quirement to obtain evidence for the satisfaction of the 
requirements through audit and transparency [12,13, 15, 
20].  This allows us on one hand to identify and analyze 
security and privacy requirements and on the other hand 
to verify whether a chosen cloud deployment model ad-
dresses the identified requirements with appropriate 
mechanisms based on a specific organizational context. 
The framework includes a process with three sequential 
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activities so that requirements can be extracted from real 
migration needs and appropriate cloud models can be 
selected to support these needs. We demonstrate the ap-
proach with a real case study based on the Greek Na-
tional Gazette system. The results prove the efficiency of 
the approach on identifying respective security and pri-
vacy needs as well as the proper selection of a cloud de-
ployment model based on these needs. 
2 RELATED WORKS 
This section presents a brief overview of works, pre-
sented in the literature, related to three main areas of our 
work, security and privacy issues, migration and audit in 
cloud environments.  
Security, Privacy and Migration Issues in Cloud  
Security and privacy issues are amongst the most im-
portant concerns in cloud computing. Several surveys 
among potential cloud adopters indicate that security and 
privacy is the primary concern hindering its adoption [1].  
Cloud specific security and privacy threats such as inse-
cure API, data leakage, insecure data deletion, session or 
service hijacking, malicious insiders should be controlled 
in a proactive way [9,18,22]. Similar to traditional com-
puting environment, Attacks such as man-in-the middle, 
and Trojan are also potential attack for cloud computing 
[23]. These threats are due to multi-tenancy support, lack 
of control and secondary usage and users’ universal ac-
cessibility through public network.  Privacy threats differ 
depending on the type of cloud scenario and threats such 
as lack of user control, potential unauthorized secondary 
usage, data proliferation are more dominate in public 
cloud [17]. Attackers can also exploit data duplication 
technique to access customer data by obtaining hash code 
of the stored file [25]. In [26], privacy risks are considered 
from cloud, user, stored data and data access perspectives 
and highlight some mechanism for addressing the risks 
from these perspectives. There are works that focus on 
cloud migration decision. For instance a cost, benefits and 
risk tool is proposed by [27] to support the public IaaS 
cloud migration decision. Security issues are analysed for 
model based migrating oof a legacy system into cloud by 
[24]. A systematic literature review on cloud migration 
research is performed by [28] and results show that there 
is a lack of work focusing on a comprehensive decision 
framework for cloud migration taking into consideration 
requirements, feasibility study, migration strategy, execu-
tion, evaluation and cross cutting concerns. In [29], it is 
observed that companies wishing to migrate lack of 
proper ways for conducting an in-depth analysis in order 
to understand rationalization for migration and best pos-
sible time for migration.  It is vital to understand the se-
curity, privacy, and other releated migration issues and 
control should be in place to address the threats and risks 
that arise from the issues.   
Cloud Related Standards and Audit 
The increasing demand of cloud computing empha-
sizes the ncecessity of developing standard to provide 
detailed guideline and recommendations for both CSP 
and cloud users. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) propose a standard for security, inter-
operability, and portability for the potential cloud adopt-
ers as target audience [5]. The standard includes a list of 
strategic and tactical requirements for a cost effective easy 
migration. The cross cutting security requirements mainly 
deal with identify management, security audit informa-
tion, encryption, and physical security. Cloud Security 
Alliance (CSA) identifies sixteen control domains and 
provides a cloud control matrix framework by mapping it 
with relevant industry standards such as ISO 27001 [6]. 
The control matrix includes several control objectives re-
lating to compliance and audit, data governance, security 
policy, access control, HR security, security management, 
risk management and security architecture to strength the 
overall information security environment of CSP. The 
Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program 
(FedRAMP) is a standardized framework for the security 
assessment, authorization, monitoring cloud based ser-
vices and product [19]. The standard ensures that ade-
quate security controls are in placed by the CSP to safe-
guard the users’ migrated assets into cloud system. The 
framework includes a four process areas, i.e., document, 
assess, authorize and monitor. The potential CSP need to 
select, implement, and document FedRAMP security con-
trol so that   an independent assessor confirm that the 
controls are effectively implemented for generating au-
thorization document. Finally, a continuous monitoring 
needs to be taken place if the CSP is authorized by the 
FedRAMP. 
While the efforts aboved reviewed including 
FedRAMP are very effective in providing support to the 
future cloud users, with respect to selecting a suitable and 
secure offering for their service migration, our contribu-
tion comes as a complementary support to companies 
faced with uncertainty about whch of the deployment 
model (private, Public, communauty or hybrid) would 
better suit their service, data or processes.    
Audits in the cloud are meant to provide a third party 
independent assessment of the posture of the security 
used by the CSP. It represents a means through which a 
given cloud user may be able to review and/or keep an 
eye on a security matter that has been to some extent de-
volved to a third party [2]. Because multi-tenancy allows 
several customers to be hosted on the same underlying 
infrastructure, traditional audits and reviews of a user to 
provide the expected level of assurance becomes less 
practical [3]. The SAS70 [4] was a standard audit ap-
proach for service companies to use with their customers 
instead of customers individually auditing the compa-
nies’ services.  The actual purpose of the standard was 
two-fold: assess the sufficiency and the effectiveness of 
the security controls of the CSP. The standard was super-
seded by SSA16, which stands for “Statement on Stan-
dards for Attestation Engagements No. 16”. One core dif-
ference between the two standards rests on the fact that 
the evaluated company is bound to provide a written 
statement about the accuracy of the description of their 
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system and the corresponding time frame during which 
such an assessment has been made. 
Some initiatives for monitoring and auditing the cloud 
have also emerged in the recent year. The authors in [7] 
have proposed an event-driven approach for the auto-
mated audit of cloud based services security. Dedicated 
algorithms for the detection of composite events (anoma-
lies) specified by either the CSP or CSC while primitive 
events structure is based on XCCDF format to ensure the 
reuse and interoperability with some existing security 
audit tools. In recent years, works relating to accountabil-
ity in the cloud have started to emerge. For instance, in 
A4CLOUD [9] project  researchers are thriving to devise 
models that can help put in place the set of mechanisms 
to  ensure that cloud providers are  accountable for any  
SLA breach or a security incident that emanated a lax in 
their security. A federated cloud monitoring infrastruc-
ture is introduced by [21], to monitor where data is actu-
ally saved without compromising cloud isolation by col-
laborating among infrastructure provider, service pro-
vider and cloud consumers. As stated previously, CSA 
control matrix also emphasizes compliance and audit of 
the related objectives.  
In summary, works on security and privacy issues on 
cloud have mostly been focused on identifying secu-
rity/privacy specific threats and risks and mechanisms 
for controlling these risks. NIST standard provides useful 
security information for potential cloud users for consid-
ering cloud migration. However, it does not provide any 
guideline on how such requirements should be checked 
by the cloud users and how migration decision is sup-
ported.  Moreover, it is really difficult to implement some 
of the requirements in real context such as sending secu-
rity data to the consumer on a regular basis. Require-
ments relating to security audit information do not con-
sider the transparency of data access and usage, which is 
critical for cloud based context and security requirements 
relating to disaster recovery and business continuity are 
not taken under consideration. CSA also provides a com-
prehensive up-to-date guidelines for the cloud provider 
overall information management system. However, very 
limited works have been taken in place for analysing se-
curity and privacy requirements from the organization 
setting and migration desire and lack of consideration to 
assure these requirements from the CSP perspective.  Au-
dits themselves cannot ensure the required levels of trust 
for an organisation that decides to move part or the whole 
of its resources over the cloud.  Our work intends to fill 
the gap of the current state of the art by presenting a 
novel framework that combines security and privacy re-
quirements with the  assurance requirements so that ap-
propriate cloud deployment model could be selected to 
support the user real migration needs.  Furtheremore, this 
work can also complementary support the cloud standard 
such as FedRAMP for choosing the approipriate deploy-
ment models based on the requirements. 
3 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Modelling Language 
The novelty of the proposed modeling language is the 
fact that it combines concepts from the requirements en-
gineering, cloud computing, security, privacy and audit-
ing domain. It uses new concepts such as cloud user, 
cloud service provider, audit, and mechanism, which are 
necessary to elicit and analysis of requirements and 
checks evidences to support these requirements based on 
organizational context. The metamodel of the language 
defines all concepts. 
The central concept of the proposed language is that of 
an actor, which represents an entity that has strategic 
goals and intentions within a system or an organisational 
setting [10]. An actor can be human, a system, or an or-
ganisation. In our case, organization, cloud user and 
cloud service provider are three different types of actors. 
A cloud user actor can be individual or organization who 
needs cloud service and deployment model to support its 
specific strategic goal and intention. A cloud service pro-
vider actor has two unique properties, i.e., service and 
deployment model to support the cloud users. The actor 
organisation context considers the scope of the organiza-
tional entities such as goal, services, and infrastructure 
and includes migration needs into cloud that should be 
supported by a cloud service provider.   
Vulnerabilities are defined as weaknesses or flaws ex-
isting from an actor and its surrounding environment, in 
terms of security and privacy. Cloud specific vulnerabili-
ties can arise from cloud service provider’s infrastructure 
and technology such as virtualization, data segregation, 
software environment, and computational resource or 
from the cloud user context. Vulnerabilities are exploited 
by threats, as an attack or incident within a specific con-
text. The cloud specific threats can be of different types 
related to security and privacy, such as provider data 
misuse, data leakage, virtual machine (VM) replication, 
and unavailability of data, insecure storage, and DoS. For 
instance, an actor can exploit a virtualisation vulnerability 
to access other VM instance of same physical machine 
[11]. Such attack is associated with the computing re-
sources on the IaaS level and may happen in all deploy-
ment models. Vulnerabilities and threats can pose poten-
tial security and privacy risks for the system.  
Actors within the system environment have single or 
multiple goals based on specific roles and interest. A goal 
represents an actor’s strategic interests [12]. Higher level 
strategic goals may be decomposed in simpler operational 
goals forming AND/OR goals hierarchy. Our language 
differentiates between organizational, security and pri-
vacy goals.  Organisational goals represent goals that are 
important at organizational level and one or more actors 
belonging to the same organization need to fulfill.  We 
consider cloud migration goal within the organizational 
goal.   Security goals support security needs such as con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability while privacy goals 
support privacy needs such as anonymity, pseudonymity, 
unlinkability and unobservability [13, 14]. 
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 These goals introduce requirements on the system that 
support the actor needs within the system and its sur-
roundings [15].  Requirements are the conditions or capa-
bilities needed within the system environment to control 
the actors or to fulfill the goals. When a requirement is 
introduced, further analysis is required to establish if and 
how that requirement can be satisfied. Security, privacy 
and assurance are three different types of requirements in 
our case.  These requirements support the actors’ security 
and privacy needs for the satisfaction of the goals such as 
requirements on confidentiality of the data at rest, re-
quirements on integrity while data on transit, or require-
ments on user anonymity. Assurance requirements in the 
context of cloud-based systems are evidences to support 
the completeness and stringency of the mechanism and 
satisfaction of security and privacy requirements. We ar-
gue that the keys to promoting assurance in cloud based 
systems includes establishing the completeness of the  
mechanisms to fulfilling the identified requirements; and 
performing frequent or continuous audit to ensure such 
mechanisms remain in a desirable state. Similar to the 
security and privacy requirements, a cloud user can de-
fine their assurance needs as expectations from the cloud, 
such as cloud user can expect for a safe, transparent or 
trusted cloud.  
Assurance requirements motivate an audit for collect-
ing evidence.  An audit defines mechanisms to check the 
completeness of requirements and associated mechanisms 
and identifies vulnerabilities through transparency of 
disclosing security incidents. Audit in a cloud infrastruc-
ture is specifically important for generating evidence re-
lated to providers’ support for the effectiveness of secu-
rity and privacy and compliance with other regulatory 
issues. In addition to conducting and reporting on audits 
findings, frequent and timely reports of security and pri-
vacy incidents occurring within the cloud based service to 
the concerned users, so that prompt action can be taken, 
is another salient dimension of assurance. Finally, we 
consider mechanism that needed to be implemented to 
support the identified requirements.  Therefore, a mecha-
nism is mainly defined as a technical solution to support 
the requirements for preventing any threats and vulner-
abilities. Examples of mechanisms are data isolation, ac-
cess control or provenance.  
As can be seen in Fig.1, an actor has goals and security 
and privacy requirements support the actor’s desire. As-
surance requirements motivate the audit. Audit checks 
the completeness of requirements and mechanisms by 
gathering the necessary evidence to support the possible 
alignment between what is actually implemented as secu-
rity and privacy mechanisms within a given deployment 
model and checks the security incident through the vul-
nerabilities. Note that completeness check is an offline 
activity that takes place with the support of some security 
and privacy requirements. 
 
Fig 1. Conceptual Meta Model 
The audit and incident report are performed based on the 
existing CSP available published reports and policies and 
during the usage of service resources. The aim is to en-
sure that any threats and vulnerabilities that may emerge 
in the future are identified and promptly addressed. 
 
3.2 Process 
In order to allow for the systematic elicitation of security 
and privacy requirements, along with evidence to sup-
port their satisfaction through assurance activities, we 
have tailored a process based on the underlying concepts 
depicted in Fig.1 and discussed in the previous section. 
Ultimately, such a process will have the metric to assist in 
the selection of the appropriate deployment models that 
satisfies at best the security and privacy expectation of the 
cloud consumer. In particular, the process supports the 
understanding of specific organisational needs for cloud 
migration and consists of three iterative activities: organ-
izational analysis, security and privacy requirements 
analysis, and finally, security and privacy assurance 
analysis. Fig. 2 depicts the activities, steps, and the result-
ing artefacts of the proposed process using OMG stan-
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dard Software & Systems Process Engineering Meta-
model (SPEM) version 2.0. SPEM allows creating a flexi-
ble process model as well as supports a concrete descrip-
tion of the process.   
Activity 1: Define Organisational Context 
This activity initiates the whole process by identifying 
relevant cloud user organizational entities, security and 
privacy goals and cloud migration needs. Organizational 
senior executives/business managers’ active involvement 
is necessary for performing the steps within the activity.  
Step1.1: Organisational Entities Identification 
This step aims to understand the current organisa-
tional structure based on the identification of entities such 
as actors, organizational goals, plans, and resources. It is 
important to note that the extent of the identification of 
entities depends on the extent to which the organisation 
aims to consider migration to the cloud. For example, if 
only one service of the organisation is considered for mi-
gration, for instance the data storage service, then identi-
fication of entities relevant to that service would suffice. 
On the other hand, if a full migration is considered then 
the identification should include all organsation’s entities 
both internal and external that might affect the migration.  
Step1.2: Security and Privacy Goal Identification 
Once the organisational entities for cloud deployment 
have been identified, the next activity involves the analy-
sis of security and privacy needs related to the organisa-
tional cloud deployment needs. Security and privacy 
needs are identified based on the security and privacy 
goals that the organisation has. Security and privacy poli-
cies are very important for the goal identification. Rele-
vant laws and regulations can also be considered to sup-
port identification of security and privacy goals. Note that 
the aim is not to “blindly” use any security and privacy 
goal that the literature has captured but to identify those 
that are relevant to the organisational parts that are con-
sidered for deployment to the cloud. 
Step 1.3: Cloud Organisational Needs 
This step aims to identify explicit organisational struc-
tures, services, application and data that should be de-
ployed in the cloud. For example, if a data storage service 
is to be migrated, the exact details of whether the whole 
data of a specific application or just fragments of data 
should be deployed in the cloud will be identified at this 
step. To support such identification, the organisation 
needs to consider how such deployment would affect the 
organisation internally, for example whether existing 
policies, roles and responsibilities and the organisation’s 
business strategy would need to be modified; how such 
change might affect (positively or negatively) customer 
handling and customer services; and develop a clear un-
derstanding of the benefits and limitations of such de-
ployment. 
Activity 2:  Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis 
During this activity, the identification and analysis of 
the respective organisation’s security and privacy re-
quirements is conducted. Security manager and internal 
audit (if any) are mainly involved for this activity. Two 
steps and two respective outcomes are defined, the Secu-
rity and Privacy requirement identification and deploy-
ment scenario description.  
Step 2.1: Security and Privacy Requirements Identifica-
tion 
Once the relevant security and privacy goals and cloud 
migration needs have been identified, an elicitation and 
analysis process for security and privacy requirements is 
employed. We base our analysis on the concepts of secu-
rity and privacy requirements, defined in the presented 
metamodel, to enable developers to adequately capture 
security and privacy requirements. Security and privacy 
requirements are elicited considering organisation entities 
such as organisation goal, actors, cloud migration needs, 
threats and vulnerabilities. Moreover, organisational spe-
cific document such as organisational policies, goals, and 
business processes, external sources (such as laws and 
regulations, possible external threats identified), and 
relevant technological restrictions based on the technol-
ogy used (such as constraints that might be unique for 
cloud computing environments) can also be used to elicit 
the requirements.  The identified requirements are ana-
lysed based on the potential threats and vulnerabilities of 
the CSP surface and its surrounding environment. There-
fore, this step also includes identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities to analyse the requirements for further 
refinement.  It is also worth noting that security and pri-
vacy requirements are the same irrespective of specific 
cloud deployment models. 
Step 2.2: Deployment Scenario Description 
During this step, a deployment scenario is identified 
and described. The description is based on information 
related to the deployment model to be used, the hosting 
model, the relevant services and resources to be deployed 
along with the available security and privacy mecha-
nisms. Relevant information is documented using the 
deployment model selection template:  
a) Deployment Scenario Type. A specific type of deploy-
ment model is identified. In particular, the following de-
ployment models can be selected: Private, Public, Hybrid, 
and Community.  
b) Actors Involved. The specific actors such as cloud user 
and CSP involved in the specific scenario are listed.   
c) Hosting Type. The hosting type is specified. Options 
include: On-premises, where the cloud is hosted within 
the Organisational firewall; Third-party location, where 
the cloud is hosted outside the Organisational firewall.  
d) Organisational and Migration Goals. The organisational 
and migration goals identified in the previous activity, 
relevant to the scenario, are listed.  
e) Security and Privacy Requirements. The identified re-
quirements from the previous step that are relevant for 
the scenario context add in the template. 
f) Security and Privacy Mechanisms. The mechanism identi-
fication takes as input the security and privacy require-
ments and possible vulnerabilities and threats defined in 
the previous activity. The associate mechanisms available 
for a given deployment scenario and those security and 
privacy requirements of the cloud user addressed are 
mapped. Note that, some mechanisms support both secu-
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rity and privacy requirements such as access control 
where as others are specifically designed for security or 
privacy requirements such as VM anonymizer to support 
anonymity of user activity in the cloud.  The outcome of 
the mapping between security and privacy requirements 
and the mechanisms available for each deployment is 
fundamental for undertaking the security and privacy 
assurance analysis following. 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed Process 
 
Activity 3: Security and Privacy Assurance Analysis 
This final activity aims to obtain evidence for the com-
pleteness of requirements to align with the assurance 
needs and select the appropriate deployment for the iden-
tified context. Mainly security manager, auditor and CSP 
involvement are necessary for performing the steps 
within this activity. However, senior executives should 
also be involved for undertaking the final deployment 
scenario selection. 
Step 3.1: Assurance Requirements Description 
During this step, assurance needs are defined based on 
the identified security and privacy requirements and 
mechanisms to satisfy these requirements. In particular, 
cloud users should define the level of security and pri-
vacy requirement she would like to fulfill, the level for 
audit she will wish to perform on the delocalized service 
and finally if she requires to be notified in case of incident 
at the CSP’s infrastructure. An assurance requirement can 
thus be expressed as the triplet (Completeness, Auditable, 
Reportable) as shown below in an XML format: 
    <Completeness>..<\Completeness> 
    <Auditability>..<\Auditability> 
     <Reportable>..<\Reportable> 
Step 3.2: Assurance Parameters Assessment 
This step assesses the assurance parameters by collect-
ing the evidence from the CSP resources.  Therefore, the 
requirements are checked for completeness and relevancy 
for a specific cloud model. Evidence of completeness can 
be gathered through an audit conducted by (on behalf) of 
the user or through such certification as CSA STAR 
achieved by the CSP.  Given that different  types of cloud 
deployment model provide different security levels, deci-
sion to adopt either of these models should be done 
through due consideration of the user’s  assurance re-
quirements. Assessment of completeness involves verify-
ing whether all or most of the security and privacy re-
quirements are addressed by existing mechanisms within 
the various cloud deployment scenarios proposed. Such 
an evaluation will use the information emanating the first 
two steps of the second activity. After such an evaluation 
the following assessment results can be attained (also 
shown in Table 1): a) SA_COM.1: None of the key security 
and privacy requirements are met by the security mecha-
nisms available for the deployment model, b) SA_COM.2: 
The key security and privacy requirements are only par-
tially observed by the security of the deployment model. 
And c) SA_COM.3: All the key security and privacy re-
quirements are fulfilled by the security of the deployment 
model. Alternatively, the above specified levels can be 
defined in the following way: 
Let: 
fi: a key functionality of the security mechanism 
hj: A verified functionality of the security mechanism during 
the verification 
N: the number of key functionalities 
N’: the number of functionalities verified  
F: the set of key security requirements defined in a refer-
ence (standard, regulation, or other policies relevant to 
the CSC).  
F: (           
H: the set of security requirements covered by the CSP’s 
security controls. 
H: (            
Similar to the Completeness check, the audit further in-
cludes auditable metrics for assessing the model. The im-
portance of this feature lies on its potential to allow one to 
get information on the status of the security and privacy 
but also drive the revision of them in view of addressing 
potential vulnerabilities that may emerge with time. A 
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cloud service, which security verification process is as-
sessed at Level 5 (SA_AUD.5), provides enough guaran-
tees of independent opinion about the status of the secu-
rity it claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table.1 Description of the Completeness metric 
Moreover, the conducted verification is comprehensive 
enough to reflect the true posture of the security and pri-
vacy and the timely manner in which the existing vulner-
abilities are detected, allows for corrective actions to be 
promptly applied. At Levels 3 and 4 (SA_AUD.3 and 
SA_AUD.4), though the verification can be conducted by 
an independent third party that follows a well-structured 
process, there is an element of caution as not all relevant 
parts of the security and/or privacy are probed. The lack 
of a structured approach cumulated with the lack of an 
independent third party review of the security and pri-
vacy, make the lowest levels 1 and 2 (SA_AUD.1 and 
AU_AUD.2), not conducive of some good practices.   
The above audit levels are matched to a set of mini-
mum requirements needed to satisfy them, for the 
auditability metric as shown in the matrix below.  In an-
other word, an audit V satisfies auditability level k if all the 
parameters (Coverage, depth, rigor and independent verifica-
tion) capabilities for V are greater or equal to the corresponding 
parameters for k. Alternatively, V will be assessed at level (k -
1). Table 2 provides the minimal requirement for achiev-
ing each auditability level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2- The auditability metric levels and associated components 
Such requirements for auditability are based upon: 
a) The Coverage of the verification: Coverage is defined as 
the extent to which the set of functionalities of a security 
mechanism that are relevant to the security of the CSC 
(hereafter referred to as the key functionalities) can be 
vetted during the verification. The coverage family is 
composed of three ordinal levels, which are formally de-
scribed are provided below. The coverage family of the 
auditable metric bears some similarity with the complete-
ness metric previously discussed. Though, the actual 
scope of application differs between the two metrics. In-
deed, while the completeness metric is used for determin-
ing how much of the requirements specified in a stan-
dard, regulation or policy are carried out by the CSP, the 
coverage metric helps to determine whether functional-
ities of the security mechanism, considered as paramount 
in the protection of the cloud service, have been probed. 
The same applies for privacy mechanism respectively. 
Table 3 provides the formal definition associated to the 
coverage capability. 
Let F: the set of key functionalities of a security mechanism 
defined in its documentation, 
H: the set of functionalities verified during the verification 
fi: a key functionality of the security mechanism 
hj: A verified functionality of the security mechanism during 
the verification 
N: the number of key functionalities 
N’: the number of functionalities verified during the verifica-
tion 
H: { hj}1≤j≤N’ 
F: { fi}1≤i≤N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Formal definition of the Coverage 
 
       Table 3 formal definition associated to the coverage capability. 
b) Depth of the Verification: The Depth metric is a finer re-
finement of the Coverage metric as it helps frame the ex-
tent in which a key functionality of a verified security 
mechanism is probed. Each of the key functionalities of a 
security mechanism has security properties that should be 
observed for the mechanism to fulfil that function. For 
instance, a firewall traffic filtering function would require 
a stringent set up of properties relating to packets that can 
or cannot get in or out of the system perimeter. Similarly, 
the auditing function of the firewall would require prop-
erties for recording any violation or attempted violation 
of the rules set.  
Unlike the coverage metric, which has been subdi-
vided into 3 capability levels, the depth metric involves 
four capabilities levels. One of the reason this occurs is 
that although the key functionalities of a verified security 
mechanism are often known, lower level properties 
which condition the well functioning of the latter may not 
be known in entirely by those conducting the verification. 
A formal documentation, which provides a comprehen-
sive description of the mechanism, is often needed. 
The key functionalities F can now be represented as:  
Class Quality Family and Meaning SA_AUD 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
QAM: 
Security 
verifica-
tion proc-
ess  Qual-
ity  Met-
rics 
QAM_COV: Coverage. Larger coverage 
of the verified security mechanism pro-
vides more confidence on the results 
about its status. 
1 2 2 2 3 
QAM_DPT: Depth. A detailed verifica-
tion of the security mechanism will de-
crease the likelihood of undiscovered 
errors. 
1 2 2 3 4 
QAM_RIG: Rigour. The more structured 
the evaluation of the deployed security 
mechanism, the more reliable the out-
come of the verification. 
1 2 2 3 3 
 
QAM_IND: Independence of verifica-
tion. Verification performed by a third 
party evaluator or a software tool pro-
vides more assurance. 
1 1 2 2 3 
 
Completeness 
capability 
levels 
Completeness Capa-
bilities definition 
Short Description: What 
portion of the key security 
requirements is covered by 
the CSP’s security? 
SA_COM.1 {   j, hj  F,  1 ≤ j ≤ N’ } None 
SA_COM.2 {    ,  fi   H, 1≤ i ≤ N  Partial 
SA_COM.3       , hj  H,  F   H, and  
1 ≤ j ≤ N’} 
All (Complete) 
 
Coverage 
capability 
levels 
Coverage Capabilities definition Short Descrip-
tion: What por-
tion of the key 
functions is 
covered by the 
verification? 
QAM_COV.1 {   j, hj  F,  1 ≤ j ≤ N’ } 
 
None 
QAM_COV.2 {    ,  fi   H, 1≤ I ≤ N } Some 
QAM_COV.3       , hj  H,  F   H, and  1 ≤ j ≤ N’} All 
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F:  { fi (pi,1pi,2 ..pi,k) }1≤i≤N 
Subsequently the set of key properties for a security or 
privacy mechanism with “N” key functionalities having 
each a “K” variable number of key properties is repre-
sented as:  
P: {pij, 1≤ i ≤N, 1≤ j ≤K} 
Although the key functionalities of a mechanism are 
generally known by the user or security expert as per its 
nature, the level of details regarding the atomic properties 
inherent to its well-functioning may not all be known to 
the user or the security expert. Consequently the exis-
tence of a “formal document” detailing the key properties 
of the mechanism, either security or privacy, plays a ma-
jor role in the elucidation of the depth family. We there-
fore define the following predicates DOCUMENT (D) to 
signify that the set of properties are clearly defined in a 
formal document. 
   Let Q: {qm,n} 1≤m≤N, 1≤n≤Z,  be the set of properties 
verified for the mechanism during a verification process. 
The depth capabilities are defined in Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4- Formal definition of the Depth 
c) Rigour of the verification: Rigour of verification refers to 
the maturity of the verification process, i.e. whether it 
follows a systematic process and how sophisticated the 
means of verification is. Reliance on a mature process for 
the verification is relevant for a comprehensive verifica-
tion that cannot always be guaranteed when relying 
solely on the individual expertise of those conducting the 
verification. Three levels for the rigour metric have been 
defined as depicted in the table 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. The levels for the Rigour capability 
d) Independence of verification: Verification performed by a 
third-party evaluator, or software tool provides more as-
surance than a self-assessment does. Indeed, conducting 
some assessments of a security or privacy mechanism is a 
very relevant task in the management of security, but 
more so when the goal is to sway a client on the adequacy 
of one’s security and privacy.  Three levels of capabilities 
exist for the independence of verification metric. To help 
elucidate the different capability levels for the QAM_IND 
family, let us consider the following: 
 Id: The set of individuals who participated in deploying the 
security mechanism 
 Iv: The set of individuals who verify the security mechanism 
Iv,i (qm,n): Individual “Iv,i” verifies property n for functionality m 
(qm.n having been defined in the coverage section) 
Based on the above, independence of verification is here 
defined as the intersection between the set of individuals 
who were involved in the mechanism’s deployment and 
those undertaking the verification i.e. QAM_IND: Id   Iv. 
The capabilities for the QAM_IND family are as shown in 
Table 6. 
After completeness and auditability assessment, the fi-
nal part of assurance assessing is through reporting of 
security and privacy information and incidents to the 
CSC, pertains to the level of transparency offered by the 
CSP. Two levels have been defined in relation to this met-
ric. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Formal definition of the Independence of Verification 
The first of such levels, SA_REP.1, depicts a cloud 
whereby; no information on the security is actually com-
municated to the users, a case of non-transparency. 
 The second level SA_REP.2 relates to a cloud service 
said to be transparent security or privacy wise, as the 
relevant information relating the security and privacy is 
shared with each of its CSC depending on the contractual 
clause between the two. Detailed information on both the 
Audit and the Reporting metrics can be found in [2]. 
The table 7 summarises potential assurance require-
ments from cloud users using the three criteria, along 
with the denomination for cloud services depending on 
the results on the values for assurance parameters.  
Trusted cloud is the most desirable once with the highest 
level of completeness, auditable and reportable. How-
ever, in many cases it is hard to achieve. User can also 
desires to have a safe, auditable or transparent cloud and 
not desire unsafe or non-transparent cloud.  
Step 3.3: Deployment Scenario Selection 
In this step, we will seek to leverage on that body of in-
formation for making an informed choice of a cloud de-
ployment model. Four cases can be envisaged based on 
the requirements for SA defined in table 8. Note that, we 
consider the first four requirements as the realistic to be 
Depth capa-
bilities levels 
Depth Capabilities definition Description: 
What portion of 
the known key 
properties of the 
SM is verified? 
QAM_DPT.1                        
qm,n    Q}  
Unknown 
 
QAM_DPT.2                        qm,n   
  P} 
None  
QAM_DPT.3                        pi,j   Q} Some  
QAM_DPT.4                 pi,j    P,  
  qm,n   Q,  P  } 
All 
 
Rigour 
capabilities 
levels 
Rigour Capabilities definition Rigour capa-
bilities de-
scription: 
QAM_RIG.1 The verification is undertaken without 
following a systematic procedure. 
Informal  
QAM_RIG.2 Semi-structure verification: A clear 
verification procedure exists for the 
verification but the means of verifica-
tion is informal (e.g. Manual) 
 
Semi formal 
 
QAM_RIG.3 The verification process is structured 
and follows the requirements within a 
verification documentation or a stan-
dard; and is performed by a software 
tool, formal verification means etc. 
 
Formal 
 
 
 
Independence 
capabilities 
levels 
Independence of verification’s Ca-
pabilities definition 
Verification 
process 
description 
QAM_IND.1 {  m,  n,   i ;  Iv,i (qm,n)    Iv,i      Id } 
 Iv = Id  Iv  Id= Iv= Id 
Self-
assessment 
QAM_IND.2  {  m, n,    i  Iv,i (qm,n)    Iv,i      Id } 
 (Iv  Id)= I   Id  
Partially 
 
QAM_IND.3 {  m,  n,  i ,  Iv,i (qm,n)    Iv,i      Id } 
 
Iv  Id = . 
Totally 
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Table 7. CSC’s assurance requirements and denomination for 
cloud services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Matching CSCs’ assurance requirements with cloud de-
ployment models 
expressed by a cloud user while seeking to make a deci-
sion about choosing cloud deployment scenario. As such, 
if the cloud user requirements for assurance points focus 
on “safe cloud”, private or community could be the most 
suitable one. In particular, such requirement can be best 
supported by the private or community cloud setting 
given the involvement of the user in its adaption actions 
and operation of the migrated entities. Nonetheless, a 
public cloud that could demonstrate fulfilment of such 
requirement through its certification or through other 
relevant evidence can still be a solution to the user.  
The same applies for assurance requirement that indi-
cates the need for a “Reportable cloud”.  Indeed, the ideal 
deployment model would be either a private or commu-
nity cloud.  However, should a pubic cloud owner, under 
legal clauses with the user, agree to inform the latter of 
any security incident on the infrastructure that may have 
replication on the user’s application, processes or data, a 
public cloud deployment can still be envisaged.  But in 
real cases there are examples that highlight the fact that 
CSPs are generally very reluctant to provide an accurate 
picture about incidents involving their infrastructure. 
Users requiring a “trusted cloud” a private or community 
cloud deployment model is advocated as this could pro-
vide the environment for audits, selection of controls that 
meet all salient security and privacy requirements and the 
ultimate awareness of the CSC in the event of a security 
breach. Table 8 summarises the matching cloud user as-
surance requirements with deployment models. Although 
the individual assurance parameters can suffice to form a 
judgement on deployment scenario type, we could image 
a situation whereby a set of security and privacy re-
quirements set by the user through the provided activity 
of the process requires some trade off before decision 
making.  Importantly the cloud model will be considered 
against traditional ones only when the benefit (including 
security and privacy) overweight the alternatives. As 
such in the event that no deployment has been considered 
as adequate for a given company, the implication is that 
there is no urgency for a quick migration to the cloud. 
4 CASE STUDY  
We have applied our work on a case study along with 
action research to demonstrate the applicability of the 
proposed framework. Action research makes an effort to 
provide practical value of real subject problems while 
simultaneously contributing to the acquisition of new 
theoretical knowledge [16].  The framework is applied on 
a real study context of the Greek National Gazette (GNG). 
The main aim of this study is to determine the applicabil-
ity of the framework in a real organizational context. 
 
4.1 Study context  
The main authority of the GNG is to publish laws and 
other legal decisions on the Greek Government’s News-
paper in order for these laws and decisions to be active 
and applicable. In 2010, the National Gazette decided to 
provide a service for electronic submission of the manu-
scripts sent for publication. The whole process starts 
when a document is sent by a public/private sector or-
ganisation/company to the GNG.  
The first step of this process is the categorisation and 
scanning of the document. The next involves the assign-
ment of the unique ID to the document depending on 
private or public sector organisation and registers to the 
National Gazette’s (NG) information system by trans-
forming from hard copy to electronic version (usually 
.DOC formats). Every electronic document is going to be 
included in the respective issue under development based 
on the categorisation conducted before. With the use of 
specific software all available documents are combined 
and a draft issue is exported. Qualified employees format 
the issue manually until it gets its final form. In this stage 
an integrity check of issue’s content is also conducted for 
verifying that no unauthorised changes have been made 
on every document included for publication in the respec-
tive issue. Then, the issue is signed by the general secre-
tary of the NG and is send to the Government’s General 
Secretary for approval before proceeding for publication. 
When the issue is approved for publication a new identi-
fication number is assigned on the issue, which basically 
stops being an issue and becomes a paper volume with a 
specific volume_id along with a date and the number of 
pages the specific volume is formed of. Before proceeding 
on the printing phase a final integrity check is again con-
ducted. After the final acceptance a pdf file is created 
with a digitally unsigned version of the volume. Finally, 
this version is again checked for any mistakes in the con-
text or the format of the text and after that it is formatted 
Com-
pleteness 
(C) 
Audit-
able 
(A) 
REport-
able 
(RE) 
CLOUD SERVICE DENOMI-
NATION 
3 X X SAFE CLOUD 
X 5 X AUDITABLE & ADAPTIVE 
X X 2 TRANSPARENT 
3 5 2 TRUSTED CLOUD 
1OR2 X X UNSAFE CLOUD 
X 1 OR 2 X SELF_ASSESSED CLOUD 
 
X 
 
3 OR 4 
 
X 
INDEPENDENT BUT INCOMPLETELY 
ASSESSED CLOUD 
X X 1 NON-TRANSPARENT CLOUD 
Legend:  X            Any Assessed value for the criterion 
 
 
CSC ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT 
 
 
CLOUD DEPLOYMENT 
MODEL 
 
Complete-
ness 
C 
 
Auditable 
A 
 
REport-
able 
RE 
Pri-
vate  
Commu-
nity 
 
Pub-
lic 
3    -- -- OK OK OK 
--        5 -- OK OK -- 
-- -- 2 OK OK -- 
3       5 2 OK OK  -- 
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with the respective logos and labels and is digitally 
signed by using RSA 128 bits algorithm, forming the final 
version of the document. Finally, the digitally signed ver-
sion of the volume is uploaded on the National Gazette’s 
portal with free access to all Internet users.  
 
4.2 Introduction of the process 
Activity 1: Define Organisational Context 
The first step of the first activity is to analyse the or-
ganisation and identify the entities involved in the migra-
tion services. 
ACTORS 
  We consider GNG as an organizational actor and several 
stakeholders are potential cloud user actors. These are: 
a) Public/Private Organisation Actor, which represents any 
public or private  organisation that sends documents to 
the GNG; b) GNG Employee, which represents an individ-
ual who works for the GNG, including the General Secre-
tary, who is responsible for signing GNG issues; c) Gov-
ernment General Secretary, who is responsible for approv-
ing the issues; d) Publishing System, which represents the 
information system used to support the publication proc-
ess;  e) General Public, which represents any citizen wish-
ing to access the Volumes (printed issues). 
ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS 
We focus on the goals based on the specific actor’s in-
terest as shown in the following bullet points: 
a) Public/private Organisation Actor: Publish Decisions and 
Bills; Provide Document; Format Document; Approve 
Document.  b) GNG Employee: Support the creation and 
publication process of every issue for the Greek Newspa-
per and approve GNG issues by conducting final integ-
rity and format checks. c) Government General Secretary: 
Approve GNG Issues for publication. d) Publishing Sys-
tem: support publication process. e) General Public: Read 
Newspaper of the Greek Government. 
For instance the main goal of the Publishing System 
is to support the publication process. In supporting that 
goal, the Publishing System actor has to receive the 
document, categorise the document, validate it, and pub-
lish it as part of a specific volume.  
SERVICES 
From the above analysis we can also identify a number 
of services related to the GNG’s publication process: 
a) Receive documents, b) Categorise and Identify documents, c) 
Transfer documents to Electronic Form (if necessary), d) Check 
and Validate Electronic Document, e) Create issue (Draft Vol-
ume), f) Publish Volume and g) Make Volume available to gen-
eral public. 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The GNG IT infrastructure supports the following: 
Automated management of the Issue & Volume Compo-
sition; Work Flow Management; Internal – Administra-
tion Services; Internet Services. Workflow Management 
developed with the Zone/ platform and is responsible for 
the proper collaboration of the various components on 
the platform. Internet service is based on Adobe InDesign 
software is being used in order to automatically create the 
final electronic version of the Volume after it has been 
printed in its final form  
SECURITY & PRIVACY GOALS 
To support the organizational goals identified previ-
ously, the main security goals identified are Confidential-
ity, Integrity and Availability. Preservation of integrity is 
vital since any unauthorised alterations on the articles 
may create great law gaps in Greek Government since 
any article published in the NG’s paper is immediately 
applicable from any third party in Greece. So integrity of 
the published articles is of vital importance in National 
Gazette. For the same reasons availability of the online 
services is also important since all Greek citizens, compa-
nies, public services etc should be able to download at 
any time the current legislation and all the respective de-
cisions published in the NG’s paper. Finally, confidential-
ity should also be protected for the NG’s users as well as 
for the published documents. 
Regarding privacy, the goal identified was unlinkability 
goal. Specifically, users accessing and downloading vol-
umes should maintain their privacy regarding the vol-
umes they are interested in and thus unlinkability be-
tween the users and the downloaded volumes should be 
satisfied in the NG's online system.    
CLOUD ORGANISATIONAL NEEDS 
The potential services that could be migrated to the 
cloud and respective migration goals are given below: 
Migrated services: Receipt of the Documents, the Publica-
tion of the Volume.  Migrating these services to the cloud 
is important and necessary since these services are the 
most demanding and vital services. Through these ser-
vices GNG supports public and private organizations and 
the citizens, while the rest of the services are mostly in-
ternal services regarding the publication of the docu-
ments. Currently, receiving the documents is based on a 
server that has to be active constantly, which creates 
many threats since it is a single point failure for the GNG. 
 Migration goal: in-house maintenance constraints and 
cost reduction. The demands on infrastructure and ma-
chine capabilities change on a monthly basis since the 
publishing needs of the government and the organiza-
tions increase dramatically. Due to the Greek financial 
crisis the available government funding for maintaining 
these services in house and covering the respective opera-
tional costs lowers on a monthly basis. Current infrastruc-
ture will fail to serve the correct and proper documents’ 
reception. Migrating these services on the cloud will solve 
the infrastructure limitations, sources’ constraints and 
backup issues with much lesser cost that the one needed 
for the GNG for that. Volumes’ availability will be better 
ensured in a cloud context rather than on dedicated serv-
ers that have specific processing capabilities and might 
introduce restrictions on simultaneous access from spe-
cific number of citizens. Cloud can offer combined infra-
structures, on demand increase or decrease of the space 
and process sources depending on the time period with-
out the GNG to be forced to buy new costly infrastruc-
ture. 
Activity 2:  Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis 
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2511719
Copyright (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
AUTHOR ET AL.:  TITLE 11 
 
The first step focuses on identifying security and pri-
vacy requirements based on the organizational identified 
entities from previous activity and these requirements 
pose restriction to achieve the security and privacy goals. 
There are dependencies among the Public Organisation 
Actor and GNG actors to the services chosen for this case 
study. For demonstration simplicity, we will concentrate 
on one, most representative dependency between the 
Public Organisation Actor and the GNG which is the re-
ceive document for publication. Of course the identified de-
pendencies further extend with the cloud provider.  
Based on the conceptual model described above for every 
dependency a number of potential threats are identified 
like a) Unauthorized modification by GNG employee, b) Un-
availability of a specific article from the National Gazette, c) 
Interception of data in transitd) Insecure storage and e) Lack of 
control 
Finally, the analysis on this step ends up with the in-
troduction of the respective security and privacy re-
quirements for the dependency Receive document for publi-
cation. 
Identified Security and Privacy Requirements 
R1: The system shall check that only legitimate user can send 
the document; R2: The received document shall not alter with-
out any approval from the legitimate sender; R3: Users of the 
service shall be unlikable so that public and private organiza-
tion actor cannot identify the specific GNG employee responsi-
ble for handling the receive volume.; R4: The system shall be 
available to receive any document for the Gazette.; R5: The re-
ceived document shall only be access by the GNG employee; R6: 
The system shall provide accountability/ audit support  to the 
users submitted document for the publication; R7: A secure 
communication shall established between the GNG user and 
CSP 
Suggested Deployment Scenario Description 
For better describing and presenting the attributes of 
the deployment scenario, we have introduced a deploy-
ment scenario template. Specifically, the template in-
cludes information about the proposed scenario type, 
respective actors, services, organisational goals, cloud 
migration goals, analytical description of the scenario, the 
respective security and privacy requirements as well as 
the security and privacy mechanisms that can assist in the 
realization of these requirements. For the specific case 
and based on the nature of the security and privacy re-
quirements we examined and analysed two scenarios, 
migration on a public cloud and a community cloud. The 
analysis of every scenario is presented on figures 3 and 4 
respectively. The deployment scenario templates are also 
very useful for the linkage with the assurance activity 
since the mechanisms proposed in every scenario are use-
ful for checking the assurance of the requirements and 
every mechanisms itself.  Comparing these two scenarios, 
community cloud benefits features from the public cloud 
and at the same time provides added level of security and 
privacy similar to private cloud. We consider on premises 
community cloud and user can deploy own mechanism 
for the security and privacy protection such as preference 
for data security. Two deployment alternatives are being 
contemplated by GNG.  Public cloud is one of the options 
for GNG for the outsourcing of its service as well as data. 
The mechanisms for the public cloud are: P1: VM anonym-
ity; P2: Encryption of data at rest; P3: Access control; P4: Rule 
based failure detection; P5: Mirroring server for back up; P6: 
Onion routing; P7: VM isolation; P8: Data obfuscation; P9: 
provenance; P10:  Secure communication protocols. 
In case of community cloud, the infrastructure itself 
belongs to the community of the consortium organiza-
tions as cloud users that are using the infrastructure; the 
consortium leverages the expertise of a security firm that 
is entrusted with the safe and secure usages of the de-
ployed services.  Therefore, the appointed security firm 
entitled to conduct audits of the underlining security to 
verify its stringency and compliance with their respective 
regulators. Furthermore, each organization of the consor-
tium can commission what the firm allows. Each user can 
deploy its own mechanism for the protection. One related 
to a private/community cloud deployment model which, 
in addition to being restricted to a number of organiza-
tions of the same typology, features a number of security 
mechanisms including: C1: Data encryption; C2: Identity 
and access management; C3: Back up servers; C4: VM intro-
spection; C5: Data anonomisation and pseudonimisation; C6: 
user preference for data security; C7: Integrity data checks; C8: 
security audit in user’s VM env; C9: Secure isolated channel  
Activity 3: Security and Privacy Assurance Analysis 
- Assurance Requirements  
It is imperative for the GNG that all of the security and 
privacy requirements listed be met by any deployment 
solution. Rather than taking the word of the infrastruc-
ture owner for security and privacy, the GNG would like 
to perform some frequent audits for satisfying the re-
quirement of the regulators but also ensuring the readi-
ness of security of its service.  
 
Fig 3: Scenario description for public cloud 
Therefore, GNG would like to ensure its choice of de-
ployment model meets the characteristics of a trusted 
cloud as an assurance requirement thus based on table 7 a 
Deployment Scenario 
Scenario Type:  Public cloud                    Actors: Cloud user( Public and private
organization,  GNG   employee)  
Service: Receive document                       
Hosting Type:  Third party location            Organisational goal: Availability of receive       
                                                                            document service
                             
Cloud migration goals: Resolve in house infrastructure & maintenance constraints 
and back up issues, cost reduction 
Security and privacy requirements: 
 The system shall check that only legitimate user can send the document
 The received document shall not alter without any approval from the legitimate 
sender
 Users of the service shall be unlinakble so that public and privacy organization 
actor can not identify the specific GNG employee responsible for handling the 
receive volume.
 The system shall be available to receive any document for the Gazette.
 The received document shall only be access by the GNG employee
 The system shall provide accountability/audit support to the users submitted 
document for the publication 
 A secure communication shall be established between GNG user and CSP
 
Security and privacy mechanism:
 VM anonymity
 Encrypt receive data 
 Access control
 Rule based failure detection 
 Mirroring server for backup
 Onion routing
 VM isolation 
 Data obfuscation 
 Provenance 
 Secure communication protocol
Scenario description: One of the main services of GNG , receive document, decided 
to migrate into cloud. This migration shall be able to address various in house 
limitations. This scenario consider the public cloud model with hosting in third party 
location. Therefore, access control, back up and integrity of the received document are 
important for this scenario context.
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cloud deployment for which the level of completeness, 
auditability and reportable will be respectively 3,5 and 2. 
Besides the need to have its security and privacy re-
quirements met within the outsourced environment the 
GNG is also inclined to solutions with lesser cost and 
more flexibility in the management but these are consid-
ered secondary compared to security and privacy issue. 
- Assurance parameters assessment 
In this step, initially, we consider the assessment of the 
completeness of the available mechanisms for both de-
ployment scenarios with respect to the specified security 
and privacy requirements. Hence we proceed with map-
ping the identified security and privacy requirements 
with the mechanisms for each of the two deployment sce-
narios. Results are presented on table 9. The analysis of 
the security and privacy requirements and the deploy-
ment scenarios reveals that both the community and pub-
lic cloud satisfy the completeness metric. 
 
Fig 4. Scenario description for community cloud 
Security & Privacy 
Requirements 
Related mechanisms 
Public Cloud Community Cloud 
R1 P3 C6,C2 
R2 P2,P3,P7 C1,C2, C6,C7 
R3 P6,P8 C2,C5 
R4 P5 C3 
R5 P3 C2 
R6 P9 C8 
R7 P10 C9 
Table 9. Mapping requirements and deployment scenarios security 
Based on the analysis and definition provided in Step 
3.2 of Activity 3 regarding the auditability, the commu-
nity cloud in these instances offers more assurance since 
all aspects of the security and privacy are linked to the 
hired environment and to the infrastructure that support 
the service can be vetted by independent auditor, i.e., 
SA_AUD.5   In contrast the level of auditability that can 
be achieved for the public cloud would be between 
SA_AUD.3 and SA_AUD.4 at best. This is because al-
though independent audits are possible they remain re-
stricted to the GNG’s VMs when some of the security pos-
ture of the latter depend on security controls that are be-
yond the VMs boundary. Furthermore the community 
cloud offers a rule based failure detection that can be cus-
tomized according to GNG needs for flagging and report-
ing anomalies events that may be of relevance to the well 
function of its document service. 
- Selecting the most adequate deployment scenario 
 Amongst the criteria for the selection of the deploy-
ment model as specified by GNG were the completeness 
of the security and privacy concerns; the conduct of third 
party audits on the security of the infrastructure owner 
and, frequent reports of security incidents relevant to its 
activity. The analysis conducted using the assurance ap-
proach demonstrate that the community cloud is more 
appropriate to the GNG needs given the completeness, 
auditability and reporting of incidents and anomalies can 
be met at the highest levels thus making that deployment 
a trusted cloud as described in table 7. With respect to 
cost, the expenditure that may be linked to the commu-
nity cloud was expected to be higher than that of the pub-
lic cloud though we did not engage in such an analysis 
given the most salient criteria of selection were security 
and privacy. 
4.3 Discussion 
Greek National Gazette is a large public government 
organisation that faces real operational problems and the 
need for migrating specific services into the cloud is of 
vital importance for its future operational continuity. 
Thus, this framework was applied on the right time in the 
GNG since the organisation was seeking a solution on 
real issues that have been an obstacle on its daily opera-
tional activities and were adding more effort and cost to 
an already problematic and hard environment. Therefore, 
the framework is implemented and actively supports the 
GNG.   
The combination of security and privacy requirements 
along with assurance requirements on a cloud migration 
process was firstly presented and the successful applica-
tion for the authors was a critical step for its viability and 
future development. Due to limited space only two de-
ployment scenarios where presented. However, it is clear 
that the framework depending on the security and pri-
vacy requirements examined and the assurance require-
ments that the user places and the cloud models react 
play a critical role on the deployment model. Selecetion of 
private or community clouds as the more safe clouds 
cannot be made a priori as an obvious solution since the 
satisfaction of assurance requirements combined with 
security and privacy may lead to other models offering 
solutions closer to users’ needs.  
The proposed activities on the specific case study rea-
sonably benefit the GNG to identify the requirements and 
end up with the selection of the most appropriate de-
ployment model based on its current organizational 
needs. This led up to a direct assessment of the proposed 
Deployment Scenario 
Scenario Type:  Community  cloud             Actors: Public and private organization,  
Service: Receive document                               GNG   employee
Hosting Type: On premise location             Organisational goal: Availability of receive       
                                                                            document service
                             
Cloud migration goals: Resolve in house infrastructure constraints and back up issues, 
cost reduction 
Security and privacy requirements: 
 The system shall check that only legitimate user can send the document
 The received document shall not alter without any approval from the legitimate sender
 Users of the service shall be unlinakble so that public and privacy organization actor can 
not identify the specific GNG employee responsible for handling the receive volume.
 The system shall be available to receive any document for the Gazette.
 The received document shall only be access by the GNG employee
 The system shall provide accountability/audit support to the users submitted document 
for the publication 
 A secure communication shall be established between GNG user and CSP
 
Security and privacy mechanism:
 Data encryption
 Identity and access management
 Back up servers
 VM introspection
 Data anonomisation and pseudonimisation
 user preference for data security
 Integrity data checks
 security audit in user’s VM env. 
 Secure isolated channel 
Scenario description: One of the main services of GNG , receive document, decided to 
migrate into cloud. This migration shall be able to address various in house limitations. This 
scenario consider the public cloud model with hosting in third party location. Therefore, 
access control, back up and integrity of the received document are important for this 
scenario context.
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model, which ended up successfully based on the results 
described above. The main observation is the justification 
of the proposed research that assurance parameters are 
effective in the selection process of a cloud provider when 
individuals or companies wish to migrate part or the 
whole set of services to the cloud.  
Through the case study it became obvious that security 
and privacy goals derived initially from the organisation 
and its operational environment and also from the respec-
tive CSP are critical to determine the migration decision.  
Especially in the GNG where security and privacy re-
quirements need to be fulfilled and due to the govern-
mental nature of the services, the GNG officers do wish to 
have the ability to assess the cloud provider before they 
decide to migrate their data and services into the cloud. 
Therefore the framework provides an early understand-
ing of the necessity of migration, the security and privacy 
issues and the threats that support the informed decision 
making process for the selection of the adequate cloud 
deployment model. We also recommended the GNG em-
ployees to be trained with the cloud technologies so that 
cloud adaption actions and operation actions can be per-
formed properly. 
 The artefacts of the activities within the process fol-
lowed in this paper were discussed with the National 
Gazette’s officers and they were accepted especially be-
cause of the set of factors that were taken under consid-
eration before the final decision was taken. The artefacts 
were also understandable to support the real needs. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Cloud migration is one of the most important concerns 
nowadays for both private and public organisations since 
due to the recent financial situations every organisation is 
aiming on cost reductions without losing efficiency and 
service quality. However, before migrating services, data 
or infrastructure into the cloud, it is necessary to realise 
and understand the migration needs and risks that cloud 
migration hinders. These risks vary among organisations 
especially due to the variability of information as well as 
the type of cloud services each organization wishes to 
use. Finally, the selection of the respective cloud model 
that will be adopted plays an important role on the poten-
tial risks that the organization might face as well. Thus, 
the role of security and privacy are very important for an 
organization to decide which cloud solution fits best its 
needs and requirements.  
In this paper, a framework for supporting the elicita-
tion and analysis of organisation’s security and privacy 
needs and assurance to support these needs are pre-
sented. The aim of the framework is to assist organisa-
tions in selecting the most appropriate cloud model based 
on their security and privacy needs. We consider security 
and privacy requirements engineering concepts for the 
proper elicitation and analysis of the requirements and 
include assurance requirements for verifying the fulfill-
ness of the requirements using completeness, auditable 
and reportable metrics. By quantifying the fulfillness of 
every suggested cloud model it is easier and more effi-
cient to suggest the solution that should fit on the specific 
organisation’s context and security and privacy goals. 
Finally, the applicability of the proposed framework was 
demonstrated on a real case scenario.  The study results 
show that the approach supports the understanding of 
security and privacy requirements from the studied or-
ganisational context and identifies possible deployment 
scenarios so that appropriate decision can be taken. The 
assurance confirms which deployment model is suitable 
for the context.  
We plan to develop tool support to automate the elici-
tation and assurance activity. We would also like to focus 
on in-depth analysis of business issues and existing CSP 
offers.  
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